God Supports Russia's Putin

Freedom of Religion, not in Russia

• Vladimir Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church are allies . . . or at least it a marriage of convenience.
• Like the Czars of old, Putin sees advantages to having God on his side while ruling over the new Russian Empire.
• The alliance of religion and the state is still common around the world in nations like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Morocco, Tunisia and now in Egypt.

Our American Founding Fathers believed in a separation of church and state.  They could see rulers like England's George III or Sultan Abdülhamid I of the Ottoman Empire act as both head of state and religion.  It was an evil combination when a political leader could claim that everything he did was God's will.

Well, the more things change, the more they stay the same.  Now we see authoritarian heads of state like Vladimir Putin fully embracing the Russian Church ( and vice versa).

The gradual intrusion of the Orthodox Church into Russian secular life and the state is something that went largely unnoticed by the Russian public.


Orthodox Priest tries to Kiss Vladimir Putin's hand 
Vladimir Putin visits a 14th century monastery on Russia's northern Valaam Island, but appears ruffled when a Russian Orthodox priest tries to kiss his hand.

The Pussy Riot affair pushed the issue of relations between society and the Russian Orthodox Church to the very top of the media and political agenda in Russia over Spring/Summer 2012. Did that media situation reflect underlying reality? Was the conflict simply the result of radical protest activity?

 

The answer to both questions is a very obvious ‘no’. However, the collision of the Russian Orthodox Church with the ‘protest movement’ was, it seems, a collision foretold. All it took was one sudden turn for all the simmering contradictions to be laid bare, and for the conflict to move from its latent to active phase reports the Open Democracy Blog.

Pussy Riot's main crime was that their stunt was
directed precisely against authority of the
Church and of the Kremlin.

 

This standoff is much more than simply an issue of respect for religious space and the legitimacy of punishing those who do not respect it. The Russian public is already beginning to recognise this, but it still has a lot to discover along the road that lies ahead. Ultimately, it must begin to understand the relationship between the religious and public space, how that relationship came about, and how the criminal prosecution and harsh sentencing of Pussy Riot became possible. The following article attempts to offer helpful assistance in that process.

The Church applies for special status

In the mid 1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church began to lobby for a new law on freedom of conscience. This law proposed to 'put a barrier' in the way of 'destructive sects', though the definition of this was wide enough to include religious dominations with large worldwide followings (for example, the Hare Krishnas, Jehovah's Witnesses and neo-Pentecostalists). President Yeltsin initially refused to ratify the new law, which had been passed by the then-hostile parliament, but was eventually forced to give way. The law remains in force today.

The law changed little, complicating the process of registering new religious organisations, and introducing a rather abstract formula of the 'special role' of traditional faiths (Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism). In practice, however, the blossoming relationship between local/regional governments and the Church meant that registering a new religious organisation was near-impossible, permission to build non-Orthodox places of worship was only granted in exceptional circumstances, and churches, hospitals and prisons were closed to all 'non-traditional' religious organisations.

Crowned Czar by the Church.
President Vladimir Putin and Alexei II, former leader of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Vladimir Putin began his presidency with a promise to help traditional religions.

The terms of the social contract that stood behind the first two Putin terms was, broadly speaking, stability and prosperity in exchange for the political dependence of society. The presidential term of Medvedev was marked by promises of reform and democratisation. Putin annulled these promises, hence the surge of popular discontent.

 

Lacking any other strategy, the authorities have returned to play the same old card of ‘stability’ as before, and have dreamt up all kinds of imaginary threats and enemies to help them. The Kremlin’s ideological position will continue to be broadly protective.

 

In turn, the Russian Orthodox Church is ready and interested in becoming a protector of traditional values, should the situation demand it. In their proposed offering of ‘traditional christian values’, obedience and submission to authority (ecclesiastical and secular) only accentuate the Gospel truth. The Kremlin’s ideologues have themselves been busy embedding an Orthodox component into their own political work (as the long-established Russian Orthodox wing of the Nashi pro-Kremlin youth movement would demonstrate).

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From:  (Open Democracy)


Putin and Russia's History With the Orthodox Church

The Russian Czars ruled with the authority of God and the church.
The more things change, the more they stay the same.